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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 R. Bruce Carlson was co-lead counsel representing the 
plaintiffs in In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia 
Mortgage Lending Practices Litigation, MDL No. 1674 (“In re 
Community Bank” or “CBNV”).  He began his work on the 
case while an associate with Specter Specter Evans & 
Manogue (“SSEM” or “the firm”), and continued to work on 
the case after he left the firm.  He entered into agreements with 
SSEM regarding how fees recovered in CBNV, and other 
cases, would be allocated between himself and SSEM.   
 
After the final order approving the class settlement and 
fee award was entered in CBNV, SSEM filed a state court 
breach of contract action against Carlson, alleging that he owed 
the firm a portion of the fees he received in CBNV.  Carlson 
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moved the District Court to stay the state case and confirm his 
fee award.  The Court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the 
state contract dispute, stayed the state case, and granted 
Carlson’s motion, concluding that SSEM was not entitled to 
any portion of the fee Carlson had received because a condition 
precedent for triggering any payment to SSEM had not 
occurred.   
 
 The District Court erred in exercising ancillary 
jurisdiction over the state contract dispute because it did not 
retain jurisdiction over disputes arising from the allocation of 
fees among counsel, the state law breach of contract claim is 
factually distinct from the federal claims the CBNV plaintiffs 
made against the bank, exercising ancillary jurisdiction was not 
needed for the Court to resolve matters properly before it, and 
the Court had no control over the funds SSEM seeks.  Because 
the Court improperly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over this 
dispute, we will reverse the order exercising ancillary 
jurisdiction, lift the stay of the state court action, vacate the 
order confirming Carlson’s fees, and leave to the state court the 
resolution of this state law contract dispute. 
 
I 
 
 SSEM hired Carlson as an associate in 2000 for a salary 
and various benefits, as well as a percentage of fees earned by 
the firm for class actions he originated.  Within weeks of his 
hiring, Carlson identified individuals who had incurred losses 
allegedly arising from their dealings with lenders who paid 
illegal kick-backs to undisclosed third parties.  Based upon his 
investigation, Carlson filed several lawsuits that eventually 
became part of the CBNV multidistrict litigation, alleging 
violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
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(“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; the Truth in Lending Act 
(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., as amended by the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”), id. at § 
1639 et seq.; and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.  In 2003, 
the District Court granted a joint motion for class certification 
and approval of a class settlement, which would have paid $33 
million to the class and $8.1 million to class counsel.  Objectors 
and proposed intervenors appealed the order. 
 
 In February 2004, while the appeal of the class 
certification and class settlement order was pending, Carlson 
and SSEM entered into an agreement concerning how they 
would split fees for CBNV.  The agreement noted that the 
District Court had approved a class counsel fee award of $8.1 
million that was on appeal, and that, “assuming that the district 
court’s Order is affirmed . . . , Carlson shall be entitled to 20% 
of the first $2,000,000 and 35% of all amounts in excess of 
$2,000,000.”  App. 289.  Two months later, Carlson decided to 
leave the firm, and in June 2004, he and SSEM entered into a 
Separation Agreement.  That agreement states: 
 
All defense counsel, all plaintiff’s counsel and 
all courts shall be advised that SSEM and 
CARLSON have a joint interest in a portion of 
the fee in the cases set forth herein [including 
CBNV], and that, with respect to that interest, 
CARLSON and SSEM (as soon as practicable 
but in no event later than June 1, 2004) shall 
prepare and dispatch a joint letter to defense 
counsel directing that their respective fee 
interests be wired to separate escrow accounts, 
consistent with the fee sharing arrangements set 
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forth in this Agreement. CARLSON expressly 
represents that he has consulted with defense 
counsel in each of these cases and they are 
agreeable to this arrangement.  CARLSON and 
SSEM will also file a notice under seal with each 
court wherein a case is pending that is subject to 
this Agreement that confirms the fee 
arrangement between SSEM and CARLSON for 
that case. 
 
App. 258-59 ¶ 13.  The Separation Agreement acknowledges 
previously negotiated fee-splitting agreements and, with 
respect to CBNV states, in relevant part: 
 
SSEM and/or CARLSON are entitled to fifty-
percent (50%) of the $8.1 million fee approved 
in this case (after payment to objectors).  The 
parties previously agreed that CARLSON is 
entitled to twenty percent (20%) of the first $2 
million payable to SSEM and/or CARLSON and 
thirty-five percent (35%) of all amounts in 
excess of $2 million.  This agreement shall 
continue intact, irrespective of CARLSON’S 
ongoing responsibilities in the matter and any 
time that CARLSON may devote to the appeal of 
the settlement’s approval and thereafter.     
 
App. 259-60 ¶ 16.  After Carlson left SSEM, we vacated the 
2003 class certification and class settlement order and 
remanded the case.  In re Cmty. Bank, 418 F.3d 277, 301-02 
(3d Cir. 2005).  Carlson notified SSEM of this ruling and 
sought to change the Separation Agreement.  The record is 
silent as to whether SSEM responded to this notification. 
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 In 2008, the District Court granted a second joint 
motion for class certification and approval of a class 
settlement.  In re Cmty. Bank, No. 03-0425, 2008 WL 239650, 
at *10-11 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2008).  While the second order 
was on appeal, Carlson suggested that he and SSEM enter 
mediation to renegotiate their fee-splitting agreement.  There 
is no evidence that SSEM responded to this suggestion.  In the 
meantime, we vacated the second class certification and class 
settlement order and again remanded.  In re Cmty. Bank, 622 
F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (Oct. 20, 2010).  
Carlson’s partner Gary Lynch informed SSEM that the second 
order had been vacated and again sought to revise the fee-
splitting agreement.  Nothing in the record indicates the 
agreement was revised.  
 
 After the second remand, plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint, the parties engaged in discovery and motion 
practice, and the District Court entered an order granting a 
contested motion for class certification, In re Cmty. Bank, Nos. 
03cv0425 and 05cv0688, 2013 WL 3972458, at *9 (W.D. Pa. 
July 31, 2013), which we affirmed, In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d 
380, 410 (3d Cir. 2015).  Thereafter, the parties reached a class 
settlement, which the District Court approved.  The Court 
permitted the parties to use a three-arbitrator panel to conduct 
a “high-low” arbitration to fix the actual settlement amount and 
the fee award.  The Court’s final order retained jurisdiction 
over any dispute or cause of action “related to the 
administration and/or enforcement of the Agreement, 
Settlement, [or] Order,” App. 204, but it excised the section of 
the order concerning attorneys’ fees and expenses.  The Court 
also denied without prejudice the pending motion for attorney 
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fees “since jurisdiction lies with the Arbitration Panel.”  App. 
290.   
 
 In March 2017, the panel determined the value of the 
settlement, establishing a $24 million common fund from 
which it awarded $8.4 million in counsel fees.  The arbitrators 
did not allocate the $8.4 million among plaintiffs’ counsel.  
Instead, the panel stated that class counsel  
 
have irrevocably agreed on an allocation of 
attorneys’ fees and reimbursable expenses 
among themselves . . . . Such attorneys’ fees are 
. . . to be allocated among the various Class 
Counsel as they have previously agreed.  No 
fees, costs or expenses are approved or 
authorized except as described herein. 
 
App. 209-10.  The attorneys’ fees were distributed to class 
counsel, including Carlson.  
 
 In June 2017, SSEM sued Carlson in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, arguing 
that Carlson breached their 2004 Separation Agreement and 
seeking $1.9 million.  Carlson moved the District Court for 
orders staying the state court action and confirming his fee 
award.  The Court exercised ancillary jurisdiction, stayed the 
state court action, and granted Carlson’s motion to confirm his 
fee award.  In re Cmty. Bank, No. 03CV0425, 2017 WL 
3621509, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017).  With respect to its 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, the Court explained 
 
the utter lack of attendance on the part of any 
representative of SSEM, the Court’s own 
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experience with the Parties’ counsel during the 
complex negotiations which ultimately led to the 
Settlement Agreement (ECF 759-1) and the 
Court-approved Notice (ECF 761), and the 
statements contained in paragraph 5 of the 
decision . . . of the Arbitration Panel (ECF 778), 
that the payment of attorneys’ fees were (and are) 
inextricably intertwined with the final resolution 
of this 14-year old lawsuit.  This Court, the 
Parties, and their counsel have a vital interest in 
the arrangements insofar as the payment of 
attorneys’ fees is concerned given not only the 
lengthy history of this case, but to preserve the 
integrity of the various legal processes 
(mediation, court intervention/involvement, and 
final and binding arbitration) that brought about 
a hard-fought and creative resolution to this 
matter. 
 
Id. at *7; see also id. at *3-4.  With respect to confirming 
Carlson’s fee award, the Court determined that Carlson was 
entitled to the full amount of fees he received from the CBNV 
litigation because the agreements between SSEM and Carlson 
contained an unfulfilled condition precedent that excused 
Carlson from performance.  Id. at *7-8.  SSEM appeals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
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A 
 
 The threshold issue for us to resolve is whether the 
District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the 
state contract dispute.1  We have jurisdiction to review the 
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and review that decision de novo.  See Bryan v. Erie Cty. 
Office of Children & Youth, 752 F.3d 316, 321 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
 
B 
 
 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  They 
possess only that power authorized by [the United States] 
Constitution and [federal] statute[s.]”  Kokkonen v. Guardian 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  The burden of 
demonstrating that a case falls within the jurisdiction of the 
federal court rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.  Id.  
The most common grounds for a federal court’s jurisdiction are 
federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.  28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.  Courts may also assert ancillary 
jurisdiction “for two separate, though sometimes related, 
purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims 
that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually 
interdependent2 and (2) to enable a court to function 
                                              
1 The District Court lacked original jurisdiction over the 
state law breach of contract claim because it involves neither 
federal question nor diversity jurisdiction. 
2 Congress codified this principle under the heading of 
“supplemental jurisdiction” in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Except for 
exclusions not applicable here, § 1367(a) provides 
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successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its 
authority, and effectuate its decrees.”3  Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 
379-80 (footnote inserted) (citations omitted).   
 
C 
 
Neither of these purposes is advanced through the 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in this case.  As a preliminary 
matter, contrary to Carlson’s assertion, the District Court did 
not retain jurisdiction over disputes arising from the allocation 
of fees among counsel.  The allocation of the fee award to class 
counsel occurred pursuant to a confidential agreement among 
counsel and the allocation was not the subject of a ruling by the 
arbitrators or the Court.4  More significantly, the Court struck 
                                              
the district courts shall have supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claims in the action within such 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction 
is discretionary.  Id. at § 1367(c).  
3 For instance, the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is 
appropriate where, without exercising such jurisdiction, a 
pending federal case would be contingent on a state 
proceeding.  See Bryan, 752 F.3d at 322 (reversing court’s 
ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to consider dispute 
regarding enforceability of high-low settlement agreement). 
4 Neither the District Court nor the Arbitration Panel 
was involved in the allocation of fees among plaintiffs’ 
counsel.  Thus, the cases Carlson cites for his argument that a 
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the paragraphs of the final order approving the class action 
pertaining to fees.  App. 200-04, 290.  In its final approval 
order with the stricken language, the Court stated 
 
this Court expressly retains jurisdiction as to all 
matters relating to the administration and 
enforcement of the Agreement and Settlement 
and of this Order, and for any other necessary 
purpose as permitted by law, including, without 
limitation  
. . . .  
entering such additional Orders as may be 
necessary or appropriate to protect or effectuate 
the Court’s Orders and/or to ensure the fair and 
orderly administration of the settlement and the 
distribution of the Arbitration Panel’s awards[.] 
 
App. 204.  By striking the fee language, it excluded fee issues 
from matters over which it retained jurisdiction.5  
                                              
court may “reject a fee allocation agreement where it finds that 
the agreement rewards an attorney in disproportion to the 
benefits that attorney conferred upon the class—even if the 
allocation in fact has no impact on the class,” are inapposite.  
See Appellee’s Br. at 31-32 (quoting In re FPI/Agretech Sec. 
Litig., 105 F.3d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1997); citing Jones v. 
Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884 (2d 
Cir. 1983); then citing In re MRRM, P.A., 404 F.3d 863, 867-
69 (4th Cir. 2005)).  
5 Moreover, once the class action has been settled and 
dismissed, the mere fact of that original federal jurisdiction is 
not “the basis for federal-court jurisdiction over the contract 
dispute.”  Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381. 
 12 
 
 
While the District Court’s decision not to retain 
jurisdiction over attorney fee disputes may be sufficient for it 
to decline to exercise ancillary jurisdiction here, there are 
additional reasons why exercising ancillary jurisdiction was an 
error.  First, SSEM’s breach of contract claim is not factually 
interdependent with the federal claims asserted in CBNV.6  
CBNV involved federal statutory claims arising from allegedly 
deceptive lending practices, whereas the state case involved a 
state law contract dispute between an attorney and his former 
                                              
6 See Schwab v. H.J. Heinz Co., Civ. No. 11-6463 
(KM), 2015 WL 13236643, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2015) (“This 
is a dispute between attorneys only . . . . Nor is [the attorney] 
trying to either vacate or enforce the settlement.  Rather, [the 
attorney] as a third party is asserting a claim against a fee that 
presumably is in the hands of another attorney . . . . Such a 
dispute between non-parties to the underlying action bears a 
tenuous relation to the underlying action.  Analysis of the 
merits of such a claim would involve contract law and the law 
of attorney and client; neither the fact-finding nor the legal 
analysis would have much to do with the merits of the 
underlying products liability action.  In short, this is a poor 
candidate for the court’s discretionary exercise of ancillary 
jurisdiction.  This is a state-law dispute between attorneys that 
should be pursued, if anywhere, in state court.”  (citing Barreto 
v. Reed, No. CIV. A. 93–2811, 1994 WL 396425, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. July 28, 1994) (declining to exercise ancillary jurisdiction 
over a dispute between attorneys where dispute did not arise 
from transaction at issue in the underlying action, court would 
have to engage in new fact-finding, and state proceedings 
would determine the attorney’s respective rights and 
obligations))). 
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firm as to how they would split a fee award.  The fee-splitting 
case is not the type of dispute one would expect to be tried with 
the federal deceptive lending claims in CBNV.  See City of 
Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 
(1997) (explaining that “the federal courts’ original jurisdiction 
over federal questions carries with it jurisdiction over state law 
claims that ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,’ 
such that ‘the relationship between [the federal] claim and the 
state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before 
the court comprises but one constitutional “case.”’” (quoting 
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966))).  
 
 Second, exercising jurisdiction over the breach of 
contract claim was not necessary for the District Court to 
“manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, [or] effectuate 
its decrees.”  Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.  Courts have 
exercised ancillary jurisdiction over fee disputes between 
clients and former counsel where resolution of the fee dispute 
enables the court to resolve the underlying action over which 
the court has jurisdiction, see Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1987), but 
that is not the situation here.  In this case, the underlying action 
is settled and we are asked to decide “whether ancillary 
jurisdiction [nevertheless] extends to the resolution of a post 
settlement fee dispute between two attorneys, only one of 
whom was attorney of record,” a question we explicitly 
declined to address in Novinger.  Id. at 218 n.4.  Today, we 
resolve that open question and join the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in holding that a federal court should decline 
to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a fee dispute between 
two attorneys where the court has no control over the funds and 
the fee-splitting dispute has no impact on the timing or 
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substance of the litigants’ relief in the underlying case over 
which the federal court has jurisdiction.  In reaching the same 
conclusion, the court in Taylor v. Kelsey, 666 F.2d 53, 54 (4th 
Cir. 1981), observed  
 
[t]he fee dispute did not arise as a matter of 
necessity from anything which occurred in the 
proceedings of the [underlying] litigation, nor 
did the district court have control over the fee in 
the sense that the court was required to establish 
and distribute a fee.  Instead, the controversy 
arose purely from a private contract dispute 
between two Virginia residents. Under these 
circumstances, we see no basis for ancillary 
jurisdiction.  
 
Id.  That is the exact situation presented here.  SSEM and 
Carlson’s dispute is between two Pennsylvania residents and 
did not arise as a result of any rulings in CBNV.  While their 
fight became ripe when Carlson allegedly failed to share with 
SSEM the fees he received from the class settlement, any 
obligation he may have had to do so is based upon a private 
agreement between him and his former firm.  Thus, the 
disputed issue “did not arise as a matter of necessity from 
anything” that occurred in the CBNV proceedings.  Id.  
Moreover, the resolution of the fee-splitting case will have no 
impact on the class or the fee award.7   
                                              
7 Carlson’s reliance on a district court’s role as a 
fiduciary for a class does not alter this conclusion.  Here, the 
District Court satisfied its duty to thoroughly review fee 
applications.  In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 
722, 728, 730 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  It approved a 
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Courts exercising ancillary jurisdiction over fee 
disputes between attorneys have done so where the district 
court had control over the disputed funds.  Law Offices of 
David Efron v. Matthews & Fullmer Law Firm, 782 F.3d 46, 
52 (1st Cir. 2015) (exercising ancillary jurisdiction over fee 
dispute between attorneys where “court’s control over . . . the 
partially executed judgment . . . conferred authority to 
determine the proper recipients of those funds in order to 
conclude the court’s responsibilities in the underlying action”); 
see Baer v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 
(7th Cir. 1995) (exercising jurisdiction where court had 
                                              
settlement that ensured that the class was compensated at one 
of two amounts to be selected by an arbitration panel, and there 
is no assertion that the $24 million award the arbitrators 
selected was not in the class’ interest.  In addition, there has 
been no challenge to the reasonableness of the $8.4 million fee 
award.  Resolution of the state court case will not impact the 
amount of the common fund awarded to the class or the amount 
of attorney’s fees payable from that fund to class counsel.  Cf. 
Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 
1977) (affirming the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a fee 
dispute between the attorney of record and the trial counsel, 
both from New York, in a personal injury action because 
“distribution of the Grimes settlement funds and its 
determination of appropriate disbursements was clearly 
ancillary to its approval of the settlement in the case”).  Put 
differently, the class members’ recovery was fixed and it 
would not be reduced by how Carlson may split the fee award 
he received.  In short, those to whom the Court owed a 
fiduciary duty are in no way impacted by this private fee-
splitting dispute.  
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retained it and held disputed funds in escrow); Grimes v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(exercising jurisdiction where court had control of funds).8  
Here, as in Taylor, 666 F.2d at 54, the funds have been 
distributed and thus the District Court had no control over them 
when Carlson asked the Court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction 
over SSEM’s state court action and confirm his fee award. 
 
The District Court was understandably troubled by the 
fact that SSEM provided no notice of its interest in the fee 
award despite the fact both the firm and Carlson were bound 
by their Separation Agreement to do so.  It is also 
understandable that the Court had an interest in bringing to 
conclusion any matters that could have even tangentially 
touched upon CBNV, a case over which it presided for fourteen 
years.  In re Cmty. Bank, 2017 WL 3621509, at *7; see also id. 
at *3-4 (discussing Novinger, 809 F.2d at 214).  Nonetheless, 
the Court did not retain jurisdiction over disputes regarding the 
allocation of fees among counsel, SSEM’s breach of contract 
claim is not factually interdependent with the federal deceptive 
lending claims asserted in CBNV, exercising jurisdiction was 
not necessary for the Court to manage its affairs, and the Court 
had no control over the funds SSEM seeks.9  Accordingly, the 
Court erred in exercising ancillary jurisdiction.  
                                              
 8 See also Edwards v. Doe, 331 F. App’x. 563, 570 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (exercising jurisdiction even though court did not 
retain it or have control over the disputed funds where the 
dispute involved an attorney’s lien that “create[d] a direct 
connection to the underlying litigation”).  
9 In addition, no federal interest is implicated by the fee 
dispute.  That the federal claims against the bank in CBNV 
permit an award of attorney’s fees, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5) 
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 Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction, it 
wrongly stayed the state proceedings and adjudicated the 
contract dispute.  We will therefore lift the stay, vacate the 
order confirming the fee award, and leave for the state court to 
decide the merits of the contract dispute.  
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order 
exercising ancillary jurisdiction, lift the stay, and vacate the 
order confirming Carlson’s fees.   
                                              
(RESPA fee provision); 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(3) (TILA and 
HOEPA fee provision); 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (RICO fee 
provision), and many class settlements under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 include fee awards that are subject to court 
approval, does not prevent, nor is any federal policy interest 
implicated by, resolution of this fee dispute in state court.   
